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Abstract:  *
 
Our study extends the empirical literature on whether vertical restraints are anticompeti-
tive.  We focus on exclusive contracting in platform markets, which feature indirect net-
work effects and thus are susceptible to applications barriers to entry.  Theory suggests 
that exclusive contracts in vertical relationships between the platform provider and soft-
ware supplier can heighten the entry barriers.  We test these theories in the home video 
game market.  We measure the impact on hardware demand of the indirect network ef-
fects from software.  We find that although network effects are present, the marginal ex-
clusive game contributes virtually nothing to console demand.  Thus, allowing exclusive 
vertical contracts in platform markets need not lead to a market structure dominated by 
one system protected by a hedge of complementary software.  Our investigation suggests 
that bargaining power enjoyed by the best software providers and the skewed distribution 
of game revenue prevents the foreclosure of rivals through exclusive contracting.     
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1. Introduction  
Exclusive contracts in vertical relationships feature prominently in antitrust cases 
in network industries.  At issue are contracts a dominant firm imposes on its suppliers or 
buyers that may limit access to the market by its rivals.  We focus on the case in which 
the alleged monopolizer wields its market power upstream toward suppliers.  For exam-
ple, Nintendo, a manufacturer of video game hardware, forbade developers of games for 
its console from providing any titles for other platforms (Atari v. Nintendo).1  In U.S. v. 
Microsoft, the dominant software provider was charged with abusing its monopoly power 
in its contracts with Internet content providers and independent software developers, with 
the goal of excluding competitors to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browser.2  Exclusive 
contracts such as these are an example of vertical restraints, an area in law and economics 
that has generated as much controversy as any.  Given that vertical restraints are gener-
ally not per se illegal, and that the welfare implications are rarely unambiguous, the spe-
cifics of each case are important.   
We examine the impacts of exclusionary contracts between hardware manufactur-
ers and software providers in the home video game market.  An important feature of the 
market for video game consoles is indirect network effects, whereby the consumer valua-
tion of the primary product (the console, or “platform”) increases with the number of 
complementary goods available (gaming software).  If platform providers enjoy indirect 
network effects, then each may want to prevent suppliers of its complementary good from 
also supplying competing platforms (Régibeau, 2004).  When a dominant platform pro-
vider imposes such exclusionary contracts, it burdens competing platforms and potential 
challengers with producing the complementary goods themselves or finding alternative 
                                                 
1 975 F.2d 832 (1992). 
2 253 F.3d 34 (2001).  Other charges regarding exclusive contracts in the case include the allegation that 
Microsoft projected its market power downstream in its contracts with computer manufacturers to exclude 
competing browsers from the desktops of new computers.  
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suppliers, which can diminish competition.  This is the “applications barrier to entry” at 
issue in the Microsoft case.  Foreclosure of competitors can result (Armstrong and Wright, 
2007).  Whether survival of a single dominant platform is inefficient or to the detriment 
of consumers depends on the size of duplicated costs among platforms, the heterogeneity 
of consumers’ preferences among platforms and among the complementary goods, and 
other factors.   
We focus on estimating, determining the causes of, and exploring the implications 
of indirect network effects for exclusively and non-exclusively provided games.  Exclu-
sive titles are those games that can only be played on one system, because the console 
producer either created the game itself or negotiated an exclusive contract with a video 
game maker.  We examine the sixth-generation videogame console market, which com-
prises Nintendo’s GameCube, Sony’s PlayStation2, and Microsoft’s Xbox, and uncover a 
surprising finding: although we find strong indirect network effects, the marginal exclu-
sive game contributes virtually nothing to console demand.  Consequently, the data do 
not support the ability to capture ever more console consumers through locking in an in-
creasing supply of exclusive games.  Such capture is often assumed in discussion or de-
rived in theoretical models of the video game industry in specific or platform markets in 
general.  We do not perform a complete welfare analysis of exclusive contracting in the 
videogame market.  However, our investigation suggests that two important features of 
the videogame market, bargaining power enjoyed by the best software providers and the 
existence of “blockbuster” games, prevents the foreclosure of rivals through exclusive 
contracting suggested by some models (Armstrong and Wright, 2007).  As a result, anti-
trust intervention regarding exclusive contracts in industries sharing these characteristics, 
as requested (but not granted) in Atari v. Nintendo, may not be warranted. 
We develop our exposition by first laying out the economic and legal issues per-
taining to exclusive vertical contracts in the next section.  We describe the home video 
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game market in section 3 and present our econometric model and data in sections 4 and 5, 
respectively.  Our econometric results are in section 6, and we address whether there is an 
applications barrier to entry in the market in section 7.  In section 8, we take a closer look 
at the nature of software provision, which suggests why exclusive vertical contracts are 
not likely to harm competition in the video game market.  We conclude and discuss open 
questions raised by our work in the final section. 
2. The Law and Economics of Exclusive Vertical Contracts 
Exclusive contracts in vertical markets can be attacked with the antitrust laws in 
the Sherman and Clayton acts.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws contracts in re-
straint of trade, while Section 2 outlaws monopolization and attempts to monopolize 
trade.  Section 3 of the Clayton Act forbids exclusionary contracts that “substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly”.3  Exclusive vertical contracts, as with 
other vertical restraints, are judged under a rule of reason under the Sherman Act to de-
termine if the contracts result in an actual restraint of trade or maintenance of monopoly.  
In particular, to violate section 2, older case law held that illegal use of monopoly power 
must “foreclose competition” or “destroy a competitor”.4  The courts have recently found 
that foreclosure need not be total for a Sherman Act violation to occur.  Instead, the chal-
lenged practice need merely “bar a substantial number of rivals or severely restrict the 
market’s ambit.”5  However, exclusion resulting from a contract is not sufficient to vio-
late the Sherman Act, because for any alleged anticompetitive act there “must be proof 
that competition, not merely competitors, has been harmed.”6  The bar is lower for a 
plaintiff pursuing redress under the Clayton Act.  Instead of actual restraint of trade or 
                                                 
3 Additionally, the FTC Act broadly outlaws “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” (15 
U.S.C sec. 45 (a)(1)).  
4 U.S. v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) at 107; Lorain Journal v. U.S. 342 U.S. 143 (1951) at 154. 
5 U.S. v. Dentsply Int’l, 399 F.3d 181 (2005), at 191.  The decision cites LePage’s v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 at 
159-160 and U.S. v. Microsoft at 69.  
6 U.S. v. Dentsply Int’l, at 187.  
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foreclosure, the plaintiff need only prove that an act in question lessens competition (Of-
fir, 2006).    
An exclusionary contract between a game console manufacturer and a software 
provider, then, may be illegal if it harms competition among hardware manufacturers.  
Harm to competition exists if contracts that lock up popular games prevent the entry (or 
hasten the exit) of rival consoles that would have been valued by consumers into the 
hardware market.  As a practical matter, discouraged potential entrants may not be ob-
served.  Therefore, it is important to examine the impact of exclusive contracts on exist-
ing competitors, the approach we take.  If we show that exclusive contracting by the 
dominant platform reduces the market share of rivals, then a fortiori we may infer that 
potential entrants would be discouraged.  Conversely, if (as we find below) exclusive 
contracts have little effect on existing firms, then it is unlikely that the contracts raise ad-
ditional entry barriers.  
The economic analysis of exclusive agreements with suppliers in markets with in-
direct network effects, as Régibeau (2004) notes, is similar in many respects to traditional 
analysis of exclusive outlets, exclusive dealing, and foreclosure.  Under exclusive outlet 
restrictions, a manufacturer agrees to sell through a single retailer in a geographic area.  
In the video game market, the “outlet” is the hardware console (the platform), and the 
“manufacturer” is the software provider.  Exclusive outlets and exclusive dealing (in 
which a retailer agrees with a manufacturer not to carry competing brands) can discour-
age free riding by others on non-specific investments such as pre-sales service or adver-
tising made by the two parties (Telser, 1960).  In Atari v. Nintendo, for example, Nin-
tendo argued that the exclusivity provisions in its contracts with suppliers, forbidding 
them from adapting games to other platforms for two years, were necessary to prevent 
other console makers from free riding on Nintendo’s advertising of its games (Gilbert and 
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Shapiro, 1997).7  Heide, Dutta, and Bergen (1998) find empirical evidence from across 
the manufacturing sector that firms indeed use exclusivity to lessen such free riding.   
The potential welfare harm from exclusivity stems from entry deterrence and 
foreclosure of rivals.  Segal and Whinston (2000) show that exclusive dealing can deter 
entry by rivals by denying them economies of scale.  Even when entry is deterred, how-
ever, the welfare impact of exclusivity is ambiguous, because the entry-deterring price 
consumers pay may be lower than it otherwise would be.  In a model where exclusivity 
prevents suppliers from dealing with other downstream firms, Oster (1995) shows that 
exclusive licensing of innovations can increase the dominance of the licensee in its prod-
uct market.8  The asymmetry among potential licensees diminishes the bargaining power 
of follow-on innovators, which reduces their incentive to innovate in the long run.   
Upstream foreclosure, in which a downstream buyer is denied access to an up-
stream supplier, is usually studied in the context of vertical integration, although other 
vertical constraints can lead to the same result.  Theoretical models show that vertical in-
tegration can lead to foreclosure and anti-competitive effects.9  The empirical question, 
however, is to what extent foreclosure actually occurs as a result of vertical restraints.  
The record is mixed.  Snyder (1995), in a review of empirical studies, finds evidence that 
foreclosure occurs in some industries due to vertical restraints.  However, Cooper et al. 
(2005) review more than 20 recent studies and find that in only one instance did vertical 
integration unambiguously harm consumers.  They found many more studies concluding 
that welfare improved after the imposition of vertical restraints.10   
                                                 
7 Lunney (1990) challenges the validity of this defense in Atari v. Nintendo.  The courts did not rule di-
rectly on the claim. 
8 In Oster’s (1995) model, the “supplier” is a creator of a process innovation that would lower manufactur-
ing costs in the downstream market if adopted. 
9 See Salinger (1988) for an early such model. 
10 A study of the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries completed after Cooper et al.’s (2005) review 
also rejects that foreclosure followed from vertical integration (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2007). 
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The literature considering vertical restraints in markets with indirect network ef-
fects is still small.  Network effects would reinforce the role of economies of scale in 
Segal and Whinston’s (2000) model and of the bargaining power of the dominant firm in 
Oster’s (1995) model, and therefore entry deterrence and foreclosure would be all the 
more likely.  However, as in the traditional literature on vertical restraints, the welfare 
impacts of vertical restraints in network markets are also ambiguous.  Church and Gandal 
(2000) show that foreclosure following a merger in a market with indirect network effects 
may raise or lower consumer surplus.   
Vertical restraints through exclusive contracts in markets with indirect network 
effects, the most germane literature for our study, are explored in Armstrong and Wright 
(2007) and Caillaud and Jullien (2003).  Equilibrium in these models is sensitive to the 
choice of parameters and the structure of the model, and we mention a few results only.  
The former show that when consumers have pure preferences among platforms, partial 
foreclosure equilibria may result from exclusive contracts.  The winning platform locks 
in all software supply, its buyers pay higher prices, and the losing platform survives only 
by creating its own software.  Armstrong and Wright (2007) also show that without pure 
differentiation among platforms, exclusive contracts lead to a single platform surviving 
(complete foreclosure), which, though efficient, leaves buyers with no surplus.  In the 
related model of Caillaud and Jullien (2003), an incumbent platform with high enough 
quality will choose exclusivity to deter entry by a rival. 
In both Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Armstrong and Wright (2007), the soft-
ware suppliers have no market power.11  However, we find evidence of considerable bar-
gaining power on the part of game publishers.  We show in section 7 that the top publish-
ers have large market share and games of above-average quality, and are much more 
likely than smaller publishers are to make their games available for multiple platforms.  
                                                 
11 Hogendorn and Yuen (2007) allow a complementary good supplier to have market power, but design 
their model to preclude the possibility of foreclosure. 
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When large suppliers have enough negotiating power to resist demands for exclusivity 
from console makers, the anticompetitive impact from the exclusive contracts (mostly 
signed by smaller suppliers) may be minimal.  We indeed find that the marginal exclusive 
game title has virtually no impact on console demand. 
3. The Market for Sixth Generation Home Video Games 
A video game system is a hardware platform that allows demanders (the video 
game consumers) to trade with suppliers (the video game publishers).  Different brands of 
hardware are not compatible with each other—gamers cannot play software designed for 
one console on another.12  Because of the mutual incompatibility among consoles, buying 
a console is akin to choosing a platform to trade with software providers—a “two-sided 
market,” as it is often called in the literature.   
The home video game market is a promising setting to look for applications barri-
ers to entry.  Exclusive contracts play an important role in the market and the market is 
large.  Sales of consoles, portable devices, and software in the video game industry total 
about $10 billion, greater than that of Hollywood’s box office.13  We focus on sixth gen-
eration video game consoles, which include Sony’s PlayStation2, Microsoft’s Xbox, and 
Nintendo’s GameCube.14
PlayStation2 entered the US market in October 2000, and Xbox and GameCube 
appeared one year later.  Table 1 shows characteristics of the consoles.  Microsoft intro-
duced the console with the best hardware quality, evaluated in terms of processing speed 
and memory (RAM).  Table 1 shows that Microsoft priced Xbox similarly to Play-
                                                 
12 The exception is the backward compatibility of different generations of hardware produced by the same 
manufacturer. For example, the software for PlayStation (5th generation) can be played in PlayStation 2.  
13 Entertainment Software Association, “Essential facts about the computer and video game industry,” May, 
18, 2005. 
14 The sixth generation also includes its pioneering member, Sega’s Dreamcast console.  Sega dropped out 
of the market in 2000 (before the period for which we have data) and was never a major player, and we do 
not include Dreamcast in the analysis.  Dreamcast probably died because of Sega’s legacy of past product 
failures and the limitation that it could not play video DVDs as could PlayStation2. 
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Station2, while Nintendo set GameCube’s price well below the other two.  The sixth gen-
eration began to be superseded near the end of 2005 when Microsoft introduced the Xbox 
360.  Our data covers March 2002 to December 2004. 
PlayStation2 enjoys the largest amount of available software (Table 2).  During 
our data period, PlayStation2 started with the most software and provided almost half of 
the new software available in the market.  PlayStation2’s leading position in software 
availability strengthened hardware sales, due to the complementary nature of hardware 
and software, and helps to explain why PlayStation2 was the best-selling console in the 
market given its higher price and poorer hardware quality.  The monthly figures for sales 
(Figure 1) show that PlayStation2 had the highest console sales until Xbox overtakes its 
market-leading position in 2004. 
There are different sources of revenue for console producers: revenue from sales 
of consoles and games produced in-house, and license fees and royalties charged to inde-
pendent game publishers.  To attract consumers, console producers advertise in the media 
and exhibit at trade shows at great expense.  The platform providers do not expend this 
tremendous effort chasing console sales to profit from the hardware.  There is evidence 
that Microsoft and Sony set console prices below marginal cost.15  As in most two-sided 
markets, profits are extracted from one side only (Rochet and Tirole, 2003): console 
makers hope to earn their profit from the sales of gaming software.    
The business model of the gaming industry—hardware as a loss leader for soft-
ware—explains why console makers charge game developers no access fees and even 
subsidize creation of games by providing development tools for their platform  (Rochet 
and Tirole, 2003).  Table 2 shows that independent software publishers produce the most 
software for each console (91% of the total), with a far smaller amount created by the 
                                                 
15 D. Becket and J. Wilcox (“Will Xbox Drain Microsoft?” CNET News.com, March 6, 2001) estimate that 
Xbox initially cost Microsoft $375 per unit.  This is the marginal cost of the hardware only, not including 
sales, marketing, or development costs.  The price at launch for Xbox was $299.  The article also cites a 
claim that Microsoft’s per-unit loss on Xbox is comparable to Sony’s loss on PlayStation2. 
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console manufacturers.  A software publisher may produce its games in-house or contract 
out to independent developers.  Games sold by independent publishers profit the console 
maker through royalty agreements.  The average cost of developing a 128-bit game is 
about $6 million.16  
A game publisher will consider a console’s current and expected installed base 
when deciding for which platforms to write a game.  Negotiations over license fees and 
royalties hinge in part on whether the game is exclusive to the console.  In Table 2, we 
also show the proportion of software that is provided exclusively, which is one measure 
of product differentiation among systems. PlayStation2 has the greatest proportion of ex-
clusive software, showing its bargaining strength with software publishers and developers. 
Software publishers undertake their own marketing as well through advertising and trade 
show participation.  Costs are certain but rewards are not:  only a small portion of games 
is profitable.17  The distribution of returns is highly skewed: a mega-hit such as Grand 
Theft Auto – San Andreas has a return more than 40 times the average development cost. 
4. Modeling Console Demand 
To address whether vertical exclusive contracts in the industry lead to applica-
tions barriers to entry, we model the hardware adoption side of the platform market for 
video games.  The techniques we use are now well established in the empirical literature 
on indirect network effects (Chou and Shy, 1990; Church and Gandal, 1992, 1993; Nair, 
et al., 2004), and we therefore present them here in abbreviated form.  Our empirical 
models are taken from and described more fully in Prieger and Hu (2006), where we de-
rive and estimate a complete model of consumer utility for hardware and software and 
                                                 
16 Southwest Securities, Interactive Entertainment Software: Industry Report, Fall, 2000.  The figure in-
cludes licensing fees paid to content providers.  For example, publishers of NBA basketball games pay li-
cense fees to the league. 
17 The fraction of software that earns positive profit has been estimated to be in the five to ten percent range 
(Coughlan, 2004; DFC Intelligence, The Business of Computer and Video Games, March 2004, summa-
rized at http://www.dfcint.com/game_article/feb04article.html).   
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competitive, free entry supply of software.18  Here we focus on the empirical part of the 
model for console demand.   
The decision tree for the consumers’ choice of console has two levels.  In the first 
stage, consumers decide whether to buy a console or to make no purchase.  If a household 
decides to buy, it next chooses among the J = 3 alternative brands.  The decision tree, 
along with suitable assumptions for the random elements of consumers’ utility, leads to a 
nested logit estimating equation: 
 ln(sjt) – ln(s0t) = cj + dt + βppjt  + δ ln(Njt) + σ ln(sjt|g) + ξjt (1) 
where sjt is market share, is the market share of the outside alternative (no purchase), 
and t indexes the months in our data.  When calculating market shares, we assume that 
each household buys one console only.  This model leads to an intuitive substitution pat-
tern: when a household switches away from a console it is more likely to switch to an-
other console than to not buying at all.  As described in 
0ts
Prieger and Hu (2006), equation 
(1) can be derived from utility maximizing consumers with preferences for hardware and 
software. 
On the right side of equation (1), cj is a dummy variable for brand j, subsuming 
the impact on demand of the hardware attributes of a system, which do not change within 
the generation.  Term dt represents a set of holiday and year indicator variables.  We al-
low console demand to differ during peak game purchasing times:  June for the start of 
summer vacation, and November/December for the year-end holiday season.  The hard-
ware price is pjt.  Njt is the number of software titles available, so that the important pa-
rameter δ measures the strength of the indirect network effect.  We remove the skewness 
of the software distribution and reduce the influence of outliers by choosing Njt to enter (1) 
in log form.   
                                                 
18 Our model for console demand differs in specification from that in Prieger and Hu (2006).  We also use a 
different source for our software data. 
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The term sjt|g is the within-group market share of console j (defined as sjt /(1 – s0t)); 
its coefficient σ  represents the correlation between consumer choices within the nest, and 
thus is bounded between zero and one.  Higher values of σ  reflect a greater likelihood 
that a consumer switching away from one gaming console will choose another system 
rather than none at all.  The error term ξjt captures the deviation of average hardware 
quality of console j known to the consumers but not the econometrician, and we assume 
that (conditional on exogenous observables) it has zero mean.  The variable ξjt incorpo-
rates all variables pertaining to consumer perceptions about the hardware brand not else-
where included in the data, such as advertising and the “word on the street”.  Because we 
include console effects, ξjt represents deviations over time (net of the average tastes for 
console j) in consumer tastes for the console brand.  Allowing ξjt to vary over time re-
flects the non-constant nature of advertising and evolving consumer perceptions of the 
brand. 
We estimate the model via an efficient version of linear instrumental variables, a 
procedure suggested by Berry (1994) that is commonly used in demand estimation of dis-
crete choice models using aggregate data.  We use a GMM procedure that is efficient in 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.19  It is important to note that we 
do not estimate a fully dynamic structural model here.20  In particular, hardware demand 
is based only on the current stock of software available, without explicitly accounting for 
expected future software variety.  These expectations no doubt contribute to the console-
specific and console-year fixed effects in the demand estimation. 
                                                 
19 See Prieger and Hu (2006) for a discussion of why autocorrelation may arise in this model.  We use the 
two-step efficient GMM estimator, where the covariance matrix used for second-step estimation and calcu-
lation of standard errors is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  The Newey-West kernel (with 
bandwidth set to two lags) is used to correct for autocorrelation.   
20 See Lee (2007) for a preliminary attempt at dynamic empirical modeling of the video game market. 
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5. Data and Endogeneity Issues 
The data we analyze is for the sixth-generation home video game market.  The 
potential market size for hardware is the total number of households with at least one 
television.21  Monthly console sales data from NPD Fun Group, along with the calculated 
market size, allows us to create all market share variables from March 2002 to December 
2004, giving us 34 months of data per console.22  The start of the sample period accords 
with Xbox’s entrance into the Japanese market, necessary since we use Japanese market 
data as instruments.  The end of the period is chosen to minimize the possible impact on 
demand due to the anticipated introduction of Xbox 360, the first next generation sys-
tem.23  Summary statistics for the data are in Table 3. 
Monthly hardware prices (average of weekly prices) are from the websites of ma-
jor retail chains.24  The game title data for software is also from the NPD Fun Group, and 
includes all games published for the three consoles.  For each title, the data include the 
publisher, date of issue, and monthly revenue by console.  When constructing the soft-
ware variety variable Njt from these data, we allow the possibility that software is “per-
ishable” in the utility function of consumers.  Instead of adopting the measure used in 
Clements and Ohashi (2005) and other studies of total software variety, accumulated 
since the introduction of the console, we investigate whether potential consumers care 
more about recent titles.  Thus, we split software into two categories: new titles (those 
issued in the current and previous three months) and the rest of the accumulated (older) 
titles.  Splitting out older software is suggested by evidence that the life cycle of a video 
game title is often brief, with more than 50% (and sometimes as much as 80%) of sales 
                                                 
21 Television ownership data are from the US Census Bureau’s 2004-2005 Statistical Abstract of the United 
States (data for 2002). 
22 The NPD console sales data were acquired from gaming news site PCvsConsole.com. 
23 Microsoft announced Xbox 360 in May 2005 and launched it in November 2005.  Since we do not model 
forward-looking behavior in our model, we end our sample period well before Xbox 360 was announced.   
24 Prices are from CompUSA, Electronics Boutique, Target, Game Stop, Fry’s Electronic, Toys “R” Us and 
KB Toy Works.  Prices are adjusted with the CPI for “all urban consumers, all items”. 
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typically occurring during the first three months after its release (Coughlan, 2001, 
2004).25     
In the rest of this section, we address the potential endogeneity of several of the 
variables appearing on the right side of the estimating equation for hardware adoption 
and discuss our solutions.  The explanatory variables we suspect may be correlated with 
the error term in (1) are within group share, console price, and software variety.  The en-
dogeneity of within group market share, sjt|g , arises by definition: it contains the depend-
ent variable, sjt.  Console price pjt is most likely positively correlated with the unobserved 
attributes ξjt because an improvement in brand image will increase consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for consoles, which affects prices in the market.  Finally, the endogeneity of 
game variety arises from the indirect network effects: positive shocks to hardware de-
mand increase both the installed base and software provision.   
The solutions we propose for these endogeneity issues are as follows.  To control 
for endogeneity of the within group market share, we use the revenue-weighted average 
age of software available for a console.  An older average age of titles signals the pres-
ence of popular, long-lived games for a platform, which increase market share among 
consoles (Clements and Ohashi, 2005).  To control for endogeneity of console price, we 
use the retail console price in Japan.26  Prices in Japan are correlated with US prices be-
cause both depend on production costs (all consoles are manufactured at the same loca-
tion).  However, Japanese prices will not be correlated with unobserved console charac-
teristics ξjt in the US hardware equation if Japanese gamers have different tastes for 
games and systems.  The pattern of console sales in the Japanese market shows evidence 
for differing tastes.  For example, unlike its strong performance in the US market, the 
                                                 
25 In our sample, an average of 59% of total revenue is gained by the end of the first three full calendar 
months after issue of a title.  Almost one-fifth of titles gain more than 75% of their total revenue during the 
same period.  These calculations include only titles out for at least a year. 
26 Japanese console prices are from Nikkei News; sales figures are from industry-research firm Media Create. 
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sales of Xbox lag in the Japanese market, even with a similar price and game variety 
comparison to GameCube as in the US market.  Johns (2006) attributes the widely differ-
ing market shares in US and Japan to cultural biases and specificity, and argues that the 
Japanese video game market is isolated from the US market.27    
We instrument for prices with the Japanese-US exchange rate.  Since some of the 
consoles were manufactured in Japan, fluctuations in the exchange rate should affect retail 
prices in the US (ρ = 0.70).28  Software variety is instrumented with the accumulated game 
variety in Japan.29  Japanese game variety is correlated with US game variety (ρ = 0.90), 
because (differences in tastes notwithstanding) many game titles are provided in both coun-
tries due to scale economies, given that much of the cost to produce a title is up front for 
development.  However, Japanese game variety is not correlated with ξjt if demand shocks 
in Japan are uncorrelated with demand shocks in the US.30  In addition to the instruments 
above, we follow Clements and Ohashi (2005) and use console age (the number of months 
since sales began) and a full set of squares and interactions among all instruments. 
6. Basic Empirical Results 
We now present the results from the GMM estimation for console demand (Table 
4).  In this section, we confirm the presence of indirect network effects from software, 
and show that older titles play little role in console demand.  In the next section, we fur-
                                                 
27 Furthermore, conventional wisdom in the trade press holds that Japanese players tend to prefer more rela-
tional games, titles based around “cute” characters, continuing story lines, and fantasy-based games, 
whereas US players tend to prefer more realistic, action-oriented, violent games with exciting graphics and 
do not demand continuity in the story line between game editions.  See, for example, the article “Xbox 
Courts Japan” at JapanInc.com (http://www.japaninc.com/article.php?articleID=10).  Johns (2006) also 
quotes a game publisher on the differences between Japanese and western markets:  “There are huge cul-
tural differences so there isn’t really any reason why games should have anything in common”. 
28  We use the current exchange rate instead of the lagged rate used by Clements and Ohashi (2005) be-
cause the relevant Yen cost at the time of sale from a Japanese wholesaler or factory to a US retailer is the 
opportunity (replacement) cost of the console, not the embedded, sunk production cost.  
29 The data are from Famitsu, a weekly magazine covering the Japanese video game market. 
30 The reasoning is similar to that for using Japanese prices as instruments for US prices. Unless the de-
mand shocks of Japan and the US are correlated, Japanese software publishing will not be affects by US 
demand shocks. 
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ther break new software down into exclusive and non-exclusive titles to address directly 
the role that exclusive contracts might play.   
To allow the network effects from older games to differ, while retaining the pos-
sibility that only the sum of all games (older and recent) matters, we replace δ ln(Njt) in 
the estimating equation (2) with the transformation  f(NRjt,NOjt;δ1,δ2), where f is defined 
by 
 f(w1,w2;δ1,δ2) = δ1ln(w1) + δ2ln(1 + w2/w1) (2) 
and NR and NO are the stocks of recent and older titles, respectively.  In this specification, 
there are no network effects from older titles when δ2 = 0, and only the sum of all games 
N = NO + NR matters when δ1 = δ2.  Rejecting that δ1 = δ2 therefore shows that not only 
the number but the age of game titles influences console demand. 
We begin by examining the relevancy and explanatory power of the instruments 
in Estimation 1, the nested logit model estimated by GMM.  In Table 4, we present a 
Wald statistic to test the relevancy of the instruments.31  The Wald test strongly rejects 
underidentification, suggesting that the instruments are relevant.  We also calculate 
Shea’s (1997) partial R2 from the first stage regressions for each endogenous variable.  
The partial R2 is a measure of the explanatory power of the instruments, accounting for 
correlation among the endogenous variables and among the instruments, and helps to as-
sess whether our instruments are weak.  Even the lowest of the partial R2 statistics for the 
endogenous variables, that for the within group share (0.44), does not indicate cause for 
concern due to weak instruments.32  Since we have more instruments than instrumented 
                                                 
31 The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic is a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the matrix of reduced 
form coefficients is underidentified (i.e., is rank-deficient).  The rk statistic is robust to non-i.i.d. errors, and 
generalizes the Cragg and Donald (1993) test for underidentification with multiple endogenous variables.  
Rejection of the null is evidence that the instruments are relevant and that the model is identified.  
32 There is no simple threshold for partial R2 when assessing instrument strength.  However, in all of the 
cases in Shea (1997) where the finite-sample distribution of 2SLS diverges from the asymptotic distribution, 
as measured by the empirical size (to two decimal places) of the t-test for the coefficient on the endogenous 
variable in the second stage equation, the partial R2 was much lower than 0.44. 
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variables, we can also make use of an overidentification test (Hansen’s J statistic) to as-
sess the validity of the instruments.33  The J statistic does not reject that the instruments 
are valid.   
The coefficients for price, recent software variety, and within group market share 
are all individually significant.  The coefficient for the transformation of older software, 
δ2, is not significant, implying that there is no indirect network effect coming from older 
game titles.  We calculate an F-statistic for the Anderson-Rubin joint test of the signifi-
cance of the endogenous variables in the main (second stage) equation.  The F statistic, 
which is robust to weak instruments, shows that the coefficients for price, software vari-
ety, and within group market share are jointly significant.   
The estimated impact of price is negative, so that demand for consoles is down-
ward sloping in hardware prices.  The average price elasticity of console demand (also 
reported in Table 4) is -2.2, in the elastic region of demand, as the theory of pricing with 
market power suggests should be the case.34  Equality of coefficients δ1 and δ2 for games 
is rejected at better than the 1% level, which rejects the hypothesis that recent and older 
titles are interchangeable in the demand function.  Demand is increasing in recent soft-
ware variety, as expected from the indirect network effects, with an elasticity of 0.95.35  
The estimated elasticity from changes in older software is insignificant, as we expected.36   
We get the same outcome if we let both NR and NO enter the specification in simple log 
form (results not shown):  only recent software matters.  We provide a more detailed dis-
cussion of the elasticities below. 
                                                 
33 The J statistic for the Hansen-Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions imposed by the GMM esti-
mator.  The null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and 
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  A rejection of the null hypothesis of the test casts 
doubt on the validity of the instruments.  Our test statistic is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
34 The own-price elasticity of demand share sjt with respect to price pjt is βp (1− σ sjt|g − (1 − σ )sjt).  All 
elasticities are calculated as average elasticities in the sample. 
35 The elasticity of share sjt with respect to recent software variety NRjt is δ1−δ2rjt(1−σ sjt|g−(1−σ )sjt)/(1−σ ), 
following the notation of (2), where rjt is the ratio of software titles that are older. 
36  The elasticity of share sjt with respect to older software variety NOjt is δ2(1−σ sjt|g−(1−σ )sjt)/[Njt(1−σ )], 
following the notation of (2). 
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In Estimation 2, we estimate the model via OLS, treating the regressors as exoge-
nous.37  This allows us to see how much endogeneity affects the estimates.  The same 
signs are present for all coefficients, although software variety is not as significant and 
none of the implied elasticities are significant.  Thus, the instruments are able to identify 
a role for software variety in Estimation 1 that endogeneity obscures in Estimation 2.  
The OLS estimation also allows us to look for evidence of weak instruments, which can 
show up as standard errors that are much larger in Estimation 1 than those from Estima-
tion 2 are.  The comparison of standard errors reveals no suggestion of weak instru-
ments.38
We tried other division points between older and newer titles, splitting at six and 
nine months as a robustness check.  In each case, the coefficients display the same pattern 
of statistical significance, and the share elasticity from changes in older software is negli-
gible and insignificant.  The price and recent software elasticities vary among the estima-
tions, but the ratio of software elasticity to price elasticity is about the same as in Estima-
tion 1.39  For further robustness checking, in an earlier version of the paper we estimated 
a set of models in which we relaxed the assumption that households buy only one console 
each.  The results are robust to the size of outside alternative market share.40  
7. Is There an Applications Barrier to Entry? 
Can a console maker’s exclusive contracts with video game creators create an ap-
plications barrier to entry in the console market?  Barriers to entry based on software ap-
                                                 
37 Our OLS estimations use the same formula for  robust standard errors as the GMM estimations. 
38 The one diagnostic for weak instruments we tried that gave opposite results from the partial R2’s, the rk 
Wald statistic, and comparison of standard errors is an LM form of the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) statistic.  
The weight of the evidence remains against weak instruments, and, regardless, the F statistic in Table 4 
showing the significance of the endogenous variables is robust to weak instruments. 
39 The ratio shows the relative effectiveness of pricing and software provision strategies: it measures the 
percentage reduction in console price that has equivalent effect on demand as a one-percent increase in 
software variety.  In Estimation 1, this ratio is 0.4.  With an assumed six month life for software, the ratio is 
also 0.4.  With a nine month life, the ratio is 0.3. 
40 The price and software variety coefficients were almost completely insensitive to whether the installed 
console base depreciates at an annual rate of 0%, 10%, 20%, or (as an extreme) 100%. 
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plications for a system received much discussion in the Microsoft antitrust case (Gilbert 
and Katz, 2001).  The government contended in the case that due to the high development 
costs of making software applications, programmers would not create applications for an 
operating system unless there were already a large installed base of users.  In addition to 
the “natural” barriers to entry stemming from the network effects inherent in the market, 
the government also attacked Microsoft’s contracts with upstream suppliers, which in-
cluded inducements to exclude competing browsers.  In contracts with Internet content 
providers, Microsoft traded placement on the Windows desktop in exchange for web sites 
optimized for Internet Explorer.41  In agreements with third-party software developers, 
Microsoft traded preferential support and seals of approval in exchange for making web-
enabled applications reliant on Internet Explorer.  In theory, both of these attempts at ver-
tical restraint through exclusivity could have further heightened the applications barrier to 
entry. 
In the video game industry, the platform is the hardware console instead of the 
operating system.  If a console has few games created for it, it will die quickly in the 
market place, as happened in the sixth generation with Sega’s Dreamcast and in previous 
generations with the NEC TurboGrafx-16, the SNK Neo Geo, and the Atari Jaguar.  The 
question of antitrust concern is then whether games created exclusively for one system, 
either by the console maker or through its negotiation of exclusionary contracts with 
game developers, lock in enough demand to hinder entry by competitive systems or has-
ten exit of existing systems.  For this strategy to be successful, indirect network effects 
must be present:  the availability of software must increase hardware demand, which we 
have shown to be the case in the previous section.  We now investigate whether platform 
providers can exploit the network effects through the creation of exclusive games. 
                                                 
41 The contracts required the content developers to use Microsoft technology such as dynamic HTML and 
ActiveX or other differentiated content that would not be available (or available at a lower quality) with 
competing browsers  (U.S. v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98–1232 (TPJ), Court’s Findings of 
Facts, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, November 5, 1999, at 322).   
18 
We begin by taking a closer look at the results of the demand estimation, focusing 
on the firms’ ability to increase demand by encouraging the growth of software variety.  
We show the elasticity of console demand share with respect to software variety implied 
by Estimation 1, broken out by console and year, in Table 5.  The software variety elas-
ticities are in the range 0.7-1.1.  The elasticities for PlayStation2 and GameCube rise 
slightly over the years, and so does the average for all consoles.  Since the hardware 
could not be improved during the generation, perhaps the rising software elasticity re-
flects that games became increasingly valuable in spurring sales of consoles as develop-
ers created games that were ever more desirable.  This suggests a role for console makers 
to use exclusive games to attract buyers to their own platforms, and potentially to harm 
rivals’ chances of survival in the market (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Armstrong and 
Wright, 2007).  However, the inference assumes that the demand-stimulating effects of 
software variety are the same for exclusive and non-exclusive game titles.    
Exclusionary behavior through game provision will be more successful if the indi-
rect network effects are strong for games available only on one console.  Sony, in particu-
lar, has actively sought exclusivity, with over half of PlayStation2’s games unavailable 
elsewhere (Table 2).  To see how the impacts on console share differ from games exclu-
sively available for a single system and games available for multiple systems, we re-
estimate the hardware demand equation splitting recent software titles into exclusive and 
non-exclusive games (Estimation 3 in Table 6).  We let exclusive and non-exclusive re-
cent titles enter the estimating equation through transformation f(NRNjt,NREjt;δ1,δ2), as de-
fined in (2), similar to how we separated recent from old software in Estimations 1 and 2, 
where NRN is the count of non-exclusive recent titles and NRE  is exclusive recent titles.   
The main finding from Estimation 3 is that exclusive software titles contribute 
virtually nothing to the indirect network effects from games in console demand.  Equality 
of coefficients δ1 and δ2 is rejected at better than the 1% level, which rejects the hypothe-
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sis that exclusive and non-exclusive titles are interchangeable in buyers’ utility functions.  
The coefficient δ2 is not significant and the elasticity of console demand with respect to 
recent, exclusive titles is close to zero.  Only non-exclusive recent games are significantly 
and positively associated with console share.42  This appears to limit a console maker’s 
options to “starve” its competitors by putting many exclusive games on the market, be-
cause such games do not materially increase the installed base of the maker’s own con-
sole.  In this estimation, the coefficients and elasticities for price and within group share 
are again significant, and older game titles again have no significant effect on demand.  
The various diagnostic statistics and comparison of standard errors to the corresponding 
OLS estimation (Estimation 4 in Table 6) look about as strong as in Estimation 1.  
Our finding that demand is virtually insensitive to the availability of exclusive 
games appears on its face to contradict some of the conventional wisdom about the home 
video game market.  For example, undoubtedly some consumers buy an Xbox mainly to 
play Halo, a PlayStation2 to play Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, or a GameCube to 
play Super Smash Bros. Melee, to mention each system’s most popular exclusive title.  
However, note that by relying on variation in software provided over time and across 
consoles, our elasticity estimate effectively measures the impact of the marginal title.  
The few blockbuster games in existence are not the marginal titles; they are the revenue 
outliers from the high-variance, skewed distribution of returns to software creation.43  
Our low elasticity estimate shows that the firm should not expect the marginal exclusive 
game to further increase console demand. We explore why exclusive games have such a 
small impact on demand in the concluding section. 
Another way to assess the feasibility of using the availability of games as a strate-
gic weapon is to consider counterfactual scenarios in which no firm, or just the dominant 
                                                 
42 If we let both NRN and NRU enter the specification in simple log form, we get the same result: only recent 
non-exclusive software matters. 
43 The skewness of per-title software revenue in our data is 7.1. 
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firm, is able to offer exclusive games.  Although we conduct this exercise in Prieger and 
Hu (2006), we do not present similar results here.  Given that we find neither numerically 
nor statistically significant effects from exclusive software, the outcome of the counter-
factual scenarios without exclusive contracts will be similar to what actually happened.       
Although the marginal exclusive title cannot heighten entry barriers, some of the 
inframarginal exclusive titles may actually help overcome (rather than erect) entry barri-
ers.  Koski and Kretchmer (2004) point out that game provision need not lead to insuper-
able entry barriers when there is a critical mass or threshold in the indirect network ef-
fects, beyond which additional games increase consumer utility little.  The sales distribu-
tion of game titles is highly skewed:  each system has a few blockbuster games that earn 
the bulk of the revenue.  As long as a critical mass of superstar games is available for a 
console, it will  overcome any entry barriers and survive in the market.  In Table 7, we 
show the 13 games that earned $125 million or more during our sample period (the aver-
age revenue for all the other titles in the data is only about $10 million).  The table shows 
that despite the huge revenue the Grand Theft Auto games (which were initially exclusive 
titles) earned for PlayStation2, Microsoft was able to carve out enough market share for 
Xbox to be viable by providing its exclusive Halo titles.  It is also interesting to note that 
over half the titles among the top 13 are non-exclusive titles anyway, and therefore do not 
lock players into any single platform. 
8. Characterizing Exclusivity in Contracting 
Why is the impact of the marginal exclusive game title so minimal?  Examining 
the characteristics of exclusive and non-exclusive titles in Table 8 hints at the answer.  In 
our discussion, we focus on the two market leaders, although statistics for GameCube are 
also in Table 8.  Despite the presence of blockbuster exclusive games among the top 
earners (Table 7), both PlayStation2 and Xbox garner most of their revenue from non-
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exclusive titles.  For PlayStation2, this is true even though there are more exclusive 
games than non-exclusive games.44  Looking at average and median sales per title makes 
it clear that not all games are created equal:  non-exclusive games are more profitable on 
average.  A battery of hypothesis tests, also reported in Table 7, generally confirms that 
the mean and median revenue per title is higher for non-exclusive games.  Furthermore, 
for PlayStation2 non-exclusive games earn their revenue quicker than do exclusive games, 
as measured by the percentage of total revenue earned in the first four months of release, 
so that non-exclusive titles look even more attractive in present-value terms. 
Compared to third-party exclusive games created by independent publishers,   ex-
clusive, self-provided games garner more revenue on average.  The hierarchy, then, is 
that third-party non-exclusive games earn the most money on average, followed by self-
provided games and then third-party exclusive games.  The implication: in general (but 
with notable exceptions) only the lowest quality, least desirable games are available for 
exclusive contracting with third party publishers.  Why? 
The game development and publishing industry has changed greatly from the 
third-generation days of Nintendo’s exclusive contracts with suppliers, in which a devel-
oper’s entire line of games was locked into a single console.  One industry marketing re-
port points out that the spiraling cost of video game creation requires unit sales levels so 
large that only one in twenty titles breaks even.45  Thus, software publishers simply can-
not afford to lock themselves into a single platform, and publishers with enough market 
power of their own resist signing exclusive contracts.  
It is beyond question that there are game publishers with enough market clout to 
bring substantial bargaining power to the table in negotiations with console makers.  In 
                                                 
44 It is also true even if the Grand Theft Auto games, which were available for Playstation2 long before they 
were available for Xbox, are classified as exclusive.  None of the discussion about mean and median reve-
nue per title in this section would change upon reclassification. 
45 DFC Intelligence, The Business of Computer and Video Games, op. cit.  Production of modern video 
games rivals Hollywood in the size and scope of the endeavor.  Creating a game requires teams of game 
designers, programmers, graphic artists, audio technicians, and producers. 
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Table 9, we show the characteristics of software produced by the top seven publishers, 
including console makers Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo.  A full quarter of industry 
software revenue in our data is garnered by Electronic Arts (EA).  EA also accounts for 
over half the games on the list of top selling titles in Table 7.  One reason is that EA’s 
games are of high average quality.46  Their average quality score (shown in Table 9) is 
almost 25% higher than the average of publishers outside the top seven.  EA’s games also 
earn more revenue per title (nearly $17 million) than any other independent publisher in 
the top group, and over three times the average of other publishers.  Part of EA’s success 
in recent years is due to its leveraging of its market power to secure exclusive contracts of 
its own in the content market.  For example, in 2004 the NFL granted EA a five-year ex-
clusive right to its teams and players for use in video games.  EA’s desirable products 
give them the bargaining power to refuse exclusive contracts with console makers.  
Eighty-seven percent of their titles are available on at least two platforms, the highest 
percentage of any in the top group and much higher than the mass of other publishers.  
The other large independent publishers, Take 2, Activision, and THQ, also have a high 
fraction of their titles (77 to 81%) available for multiple platforms. 
Implicit in models of exclusive contracting in platform markets is the assumption 
that the product attributes of the complementary good are the same whether vertical re-
straints are imposed (Armstrong and Wright, 2007; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003).  We have 
shown empirically that the ability of the leading complementary good suppliers to resist 
exclusivity can greatly alter the market outcome from the models’ predictions of foreclo-
sure and entry deterrence. 
                                                 
46 The quality scores are from gamerankings.com, and are averages of online reviews from dozens of inde-
pendent sources online. 
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9. Conclusion 
We find that allowing exclusive vertical contracts in platform markets need not 
lead to a market structure dominated by one system protected by a hedge of complemen-
tary software.  We thus extend the growing empirical literature that finds that anticom-
petitive outcomes need not follow from vertical restraints.  Indirect network effects are 
present and strong in the home video game market—a fact that, by itself, suggests exclu-
sive contracts may lead to foreclosure of the incumbent’s rivals.  However, two important 
features of the market prevent a monopolized market outcome, even in the presence of 
vertical restraints.  When software exclusive to one platform is of lower quality or other-
wise of less interest to buyers than software available for multiple platforms, a platform 
provider has limited power to steal or prevent leakage of market share by raising an ap-
plications barrier to entry.  Furthermore, when the distribution of software sales is highly 
skewed, then an entrant platform can thrive as long as it produces a few blockbuster titles.  
These features are lacking in much of the theoretical work on two-sided markets to date, 
to our knowledge.47  
There is no evidence, therefore, that exclusive vertical contracts harmed competi-
tion or welfare in the video game market.  In fact, by alleviating the typical problems as-
sociated with free riding by rivals on inspecific investment, exclusivity in supply proba-
bly enlarged consumers’ choice of consoles.  Microsoft spent an industry-record $500 
million in 18 months for the marketing of Xbox, attempting to catch up to PlayStation2 
(Schilling, 2003).  If Microsoft could not advertise its popular exclusive, third party titles 
such as Star Wars: Knights of the Old Republic and Dead or Alive 3 (not to mention its 
self-provided blockbusters such as Halo) without providing a positive externality for its 
rivals, it is unlikely it would have brought Xbox to market.  
                                                 
47 Two promising, recent exceptions are provided by Mantena, et al. (2007), who allow a single strategic 
publisher to have an exogenous quality advantage over its non-strategic rivals, and Hogendorn and Yuen 
(2007), who explicitly add blockbuster complementary goods to their model. 
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An interesting extension of the current work would be to examine the game pub-
lishers’ side of the market for anticompetitive effects from exclusivity in contracting.  As 
we discussed in the previous section, publisher EA uses upstream vertical contracts to 
exclude content providers such as the NFL from licensing content to other software de-
velopers.  Oster’s (1995) work shows (in spirit, at least—the model is designed with a 
different market in mind) that exclusive licensing may lessen competition from other de-
velopers.  While we argue here that the market power of publishers such as EA lessens 
the fear of a console maker using exclusive contracts to gain market dominance, consum-
ers’ welfare also depends on game variety.  This suggests that there may be an optimal 
degree of market power in the supply side of the software market, a topic that awaits fu-
ture exploration. 
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Table 8:  Software Characteristics by Console 
 Software Titles 
Two-Sample Tests 
(p-val)  
Three-Sample Tests 
(p-val) 
  
Non-
Exclusive 
Exclusive, 
Self-
provided 
Exclusive, 
Independent 
Publisher   
Non-
Exclusive 
vs. Ex-
clusive 
Self-Provided 
vs.  
Independent 
Exclusive   
ANOVA 
(means) or  
χ2 Test (me-
dians) 
Regression-
Based  
F Test 
PlayStation2 457 95 466       
Total Revenue ($M) 6,174.1 1,159.3 2,888.5       
 mean ($M) 15.5 12.2 6.1  0.000 0.010  0.000 0.000 
 median ($M) 4.8 4.3 2.2  0.000 0.003  0.000 0.000 
% Revenue gained  
in first 4 months          
 mean 62.5% 56.0% 57.0%  0.000 0.641  0.108 0.000 
 median 70.5% 62.7% 64.1%  0.000 0.820  0.000 0.001 
Xbox 416 54 155       
Total Revenue ($M) 2,344.3 802.8 599.8       
 mean ($M) 5.8 12.0 4.3  0.634 0.056  0.000 0.034 
 median ($M) 2.5 5.6 1.6  0.973 0.006  0.022 0.000 
% Revenue gained  
in first 4 months          
 mean 62.4% 61.9% 60.7%  0.423 0.683  0.101 0.697 
 median 70.8% 67.7% 72.0%  0.973 0.358  0.973 0.848 
GameCube 305 37 91       
Total Revenue ($M) 1,152.4 974.2 392.7       
 mean ($M) 4.0 32.5 4.4  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 median ($M) 1.9 17.7 1.3  0.718 0.000  0.000 0.000 
% Revenue gained  
in first 4 months          
 mean 54.0% 65.4% 52.5%  0.405 0.000  0.048 0.000 
 median 61.4% 75.5% 57.0%  0.718 0.009  0.718 0.013 
 
Notes: 
Revenue calculated from data covering Oct. 2000 to Mach. 2005 for game titles on the market for at least 
12 months.  Two-sample mean tests are two-sided t tests for equal means among the categories, and do not 
assume equal variances.  Median tests are two-side Pearson chi-squared tests for equal medians among the 
categories.  Three-sample mean tests are from ANOVA F-statistics, and assume equal variances.  The re-
gression-based F tests for the mean are robust tests that the regression coefficients on categorical dummy 
variables are zero from a regression of the row variable on categorical dummy variables.  The regression-
based F tests for the median are similar to those for the mean, but are based on a quantile regression for the 
median (least absolute deviations). 
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